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INTRODUCTION
A cost/benefit analysis approach to privacy concerns raises two
tradeoff issues. One is making appropriate tradeoffs between privacy and
the many goals served by the collection, distribution, and use of information. The other is making tradeoffs between investments in security, that
is, in preventing unauthorized access to information, and a variety of other
goals. Much has been written about the first tradeoff. We focus on the
second. The issue is critical. Data breaches occur at the rate of over three a
day.1 The aggregate social cost is high. One recent study puts the average
cost of a breach for a business at $4 million.2 Such estimates are controversial,3 but it is clear that breaches impose significant losses on businesses,4
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IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, Data Breaches, https://www.idtheftcenter.org/databreaches/ (last viewed Dec. 4, 2018). The Identify Theft Resource Center (ITRC) uses a narrow definition of a breach: a data breach is “an incident in which an individual name plus a Social Security number, driver’s license number, medical record or financial record (credit/debit cards included) is potentially put at risk because of exposure.” Unauthorized access to computers and networks can be “potentially
put at risk because of exposure” a great deal of other sorts of sensitive information, so data breaches
would be even more common on the correspondingly broader understanding of breach. Whatever the
exact breach rate, there are enough breaches to impose significant costs on society.
2 PONEMON INST., COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL ANALYSIS (2016),
https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach/ [hereinafter Cost of Data Breach Study]. That $4 million is
Ponemon’s estimate of data breach costs as defined in the study and is up from its estimates in previous
years. Its 2015 study of cybercrime costs defines those costs more broadly and estimates them at $7.7
million per business annually. PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: GLOBAL
ANALYSIS (2015), http://www.cnmeonline.com/myresources/hpe/docs/HPE_SIEM_Analyst_Report__2015_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_Study_-_Global.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Maria Korolov, $154 or 58 cents -- what’s the real cost of a breached data record?,
CSO ONLINE (Jun 5., 2015, 6:29 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2931839/data-breach/154-or58-cents-whats-the-real-cost-of-a-breached-data-record.html.
4 In 2014, the aggregate loss in the United States from identity theft was around $15.4 billion.
Erika Harrell, Victims of Identity Theft, 2014 7 (Bureau of Just. Stat., Sept. 2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf. Earlier United States estimates of the cost of identity

consumers,5 and society.6 Security experts have long explained how to better defend against security breaches.7 So, why does society tolerate a significant loss that it has the means to avoid?
Some may object that society does not tolerate breaches. After all,
laws—current and proposed—impose requirements aimed at improving
information security. However, there are information security laws that
“obligate companies to establish and maintain ‘reasonable’ or ‘appropriate’
security procedures, controls, safeguards, or measures, but give no further
direction or guidance.”8 The courts have not clarified the situation; there
are no cases that establish what standards of care an organization must
adopt with regard to data security.9
theft alone are also in the billions. For a summary of relevant studies, see Fred H. Cate, Information
Security Breaches and the Threat to Consumers 6, (Ctr. for Info. Pol’y Leadership at Hunton & Williams, Sept. 2005), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1291
(reporting 10.1 million victims of identity theft in 2003 and total losses to consumers of over 50 billion).
Identity theft estimates ignore non-identity theft losses from, for example, ransomware, denial of services attacks, botnets engaged in fraud and other illegal activities, and viruses. A United Kingdom
government study with a broader focus estimates the yearly cost of data breaches to be £21bn to businesses, £2.2bn to government and £3.1bn to citizens. DETICA, THE COST OF CYBERCRIME 2 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/the-cost-of-cyber-crime-full-report.pdf. For
a follow-up study, see Ross Anderson et al., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime, (Eleventh Workshop on
Econ.
of
Info.
Security,
2012),
http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2012/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf.
5 Lillian Ablon et al., Consumer Attitudes Toward Data Breach Notifications and Loss of Personal Information, (Rand Corp., 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1187.html.
6 Society as a whole incurs costs as businesses and consumers spend time and effort responding
to data breaches instead of directing that time and effort toward more productive ends. Governments
also incur costs from funding criminal enforcement efforts and from the taxes they would have collected
on revenue from projects that were not undertaken because the funding for them was spent on responding to data breaches.
7 There are numerous undergraduate and graduate textbooks on computer security discussing
how best to defend. See, e.g., ROSS J. ANDERSON, SECURITY ENGINEERING: A GUIDE TO BUILDING
DEPENDABLE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS (2nd ed. 2008); CHARLES P. PFLEEGER, SHARI LAWRENCE
PFLEEGER & JONATHAN MARGULIES, SECURITY IN COMPUTING (5th ed. 2015); WILLIAM STALLINGS &
LAWRIE BROWN, COMPUTER SECURITY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (3rd ed. 2014); WILLIAM
STALLINGS, NETWORK SECURITY ESSENTIALS: APPLICATIONS AND STANDARDS (6th ed. 2016). Both
the SANS institute and Australian Department of Defense publish fairly short lists of critical security
controls, and the Australian Department of Defense argues that simply adopting its top four would
vastly improve the information security posture of most organizations, eliminating about 85 percent of
all incidents. See, e.g., Australian Cyber Security Centre, Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents, https://acsc.gov.au/infosec/mitigationstrategies.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2018); SANS Institute,
The CIS Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense, http://www.sans.org/critical-securitycontrols/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018).
8 Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Defining the Legal Standard for Information Security: What Does
“Reasonable” Security Really Mean?, SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 19, 23 (Chander,
Gelman & Radin eds., 2008).
9 Mark C. Mao, Ronald I. Raether, Jr. & Sheila M. Pham, Data Privacy: The Current Legal
Landscape
9
(Troutman
Sanders
LLP,
2016),

Laws currently fail to provide an adequate incentive to improve information security. Why? One answer is that they fail to provide sufficient
detail about what counts as reasonable precautions against data breaches.
That answer is more wrong than right. Perhaps greater detail is called for in
some cases, but the more fundamental problem is that businesses lack sufficient information to make the cost/benefit judgments on which reasonableness in this context largely depend. An essential part of adequately defending online data is ensuring that business have the necessary information.
In Section I, we distinguish between businesses protecting consumers
from data breach losses and businesses protecting themselves from those
losses. We focus on the latter in this section and identify three problems
that partially explain businesses’ poor self-defense. Only one of those
problems, vulnerabilities in networks, raises lack of information concerns.
We focus on that problem in Sections II to V. We turn to the defense of
consumers in Section II. We argue that businesses should bear a considerable part of the defensive burden, and that they are unlikely to do so with
some form of legal liability for consumer losses. We also argue, however,
that imposing legal liability will be ineffective without a solution to the lack
of information problem that plagues businesses’ self-defense. Section III
considers ways of improving data breach defenses without immediately
acquiring the necessary information about data breaches. We consider relying on expert opinions, outsourcing security, and data breach notification
laws. None of those items are fully adequate as a solution to defending
against data breaches. Section IV proposes a regime of mandatory anonymous reporting of relevant information about data breaches.
I.

INADEQUATE DEFENSE

Businesses fail to defend adequately against data breaches on two
fronts. They fail to adequately defend consumers, and they fail to adequately defend themselves. The failure to defend consumers is hardly surprising.
The problem is, of course, negative externalities. Profit driven businesses
ignore customers’ and third-parties’ losses, unless those losses also impose
significant losses on the business.10 The point applies to cybersecurity.
Organizations have
insufficient incentives to invest in strong data security and accountable
privacy practices because, in essence, they didn’t have to. Consider that
lost or “stolen” customer or employee data often does not deprive an organhttps://www.troutmansanders.com/files/Uploads/Documents/TS_Article_DataPrivacyTheCurrentLegalLandscape_OCT_2016.pdf.
10 Benjamin Dean et al., Sorry Consumers, Companies Have Little Incentive to Invest in Better
Cybersecurity, QUARTZ (Mar. 5, 2015), http://qz.com/356274/cybersecurity-breaches-hurt-consumerscompanies-not-so-much/.

ization of its continued availability or use, as would loss or theft of physical
property. Further, the (negative) consequences of poor security and misused data fall mainly if not entirely upon individual victims, often at a later
date.11
The result is that businesses fail to adequately approximate the following consumer risk management goal: choose the most effective defense
meeting the condition that the defense investment is not greater than the
expected consumer losses thereby avoided (over some appropriate time
period).12 We address the failure to defend consumers in Section II. This
section considers business self-defense. The self-defense failure reveals the
critical lack of information needed for adequate defense, and that same failure also plagues the defense of consumers.
A.

Business Self-Defense

Businesses’ self-defense is typically inadequate. As one commentator
summed up the situation, “the bad guys basically go where they want to go
and do what they want to do, and they're not being stopped. Maybe for
every one organization that's effectively stopping attacks, there are 100 that
are being breached.”13 Why is this happening? The puzzle is that the profit
maximizing approach is to pursue the following business risk management
goal: choose the most effective defense meeting this condition—the defense cost is not greater than expected business losses thereby avoided
(over some appropriate short- or long-term time period).14
Why do businesses typically fail—and often fail badly—to meet the
business risk management goal? There are different answers for different
problems. The problems correspond, more or less, to three types of vulnerabilities. A vulnerability is a property of a program, computer, or network
that hackers can exploit to gain unauthorized access. We divide vulnera-

11 Ann Cavoukian, A Discussion Paper on Privacy Externalities, Security Breach Notification and
the Role of Independent Oversight 5-6 (Eight Workshop on Econ. of Info. Security, 2009),
https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/privacy_externalities.pdf.
12 Expected losses are the (estimated) actual losses discounted by the probability of their occurrence. For our purposes, it does not matter whether one interprets probability “objectively” as frequencies of occurrence or “subjectively” as degrees of belief. For an excellent discussion of the types of
probability, see IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC (2001).
13 George V. Hulme, Security Spending Continues to Run a Step Behind the Threats, CSO ONLINE
(Oct. 16, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134074/strategic-planning-erm/securityspending-continues-to-run-a-step-behind-the-threats.html.
14 Implementing this strategy faces significant problems in practice. It can be difficult to evaluate
the effectiveness of various security measures. Relevant costs and benefits may not be quantifiable, and
those that are may only be roughly and approximately so. In addition, costs and benefits may be quite
difficult to predict.

bilities into these groups: software, human, and network. We focus on networks, as that is where the critical need for information arises.
B.

Three Types of Vulnerabilities, Three Different Problems
1.

Software Vulnerabilities

Mass-market software programs currently contain an unacceptable
number of vulnerabilities. That is not inevitable. Software engineers know
how to minimize, though alas not how to totally eliminate, vulnerabilities.15
How to write individual computer programs well, and the basics of software
engineering are fairly well-settled subjects.16 The basics of high-quality
code construction and software engineering generally form a significant
fraction of the required core portion of the model computer science bachelor’s degree curriculum jointly published by the two main professional societies for computer science in 2013,17 and in earlier model curricula.18

15 Software is different from other engineered products in that sufficiently complex software
inevitably has some programming flaws. As far back as the 1980s, a panel convened to study the issues
with software for President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative noted, “Simply because of its inevitable large size, the software capable of performing the battle management task for strategic defense will
contain errors. All systems of useful complexity contain software errors.” STRATEGIC DEF. INITIATIVE
ORG., DEP’T OF DEF., 19980819-140, EASTPORT STUDY GROUP: SUMMER STUDY 1985, A REPORT TO
THE DIRECTOR, 14 (1985), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a351613.pdf (emphasis added). Software engineering expert Capers Jones notes that one goal of software engineering best practices is to
increase the percentage of bugs removed prior to delivery from 85 percent to something that “approach[es] 99 percent,” (not that it approaches 100 percent). CAPERS JONES, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
BEST PRACTICES: LESSONS FROM SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS IN THE TOP COMPANIES xxvi (2010). In
contrast, design flaws are not inevitable in, for example, refrigerators, batteries, and bridges even when
they exhibit considerable complexity. Software alone combines complexity and inevitable flaws. Thus,
no matter how much one invests in development procedures designed to reduce programming flaws,
flaws—and perhaps vulnerabilities—will remain.
16 However, the choice of which software engineering methodology is the best one for managing
various sorts of projects is contentious. In particular, there is debate about the relative merits of a traditional methodology called the Waterfall Model, with its origins in the late 1960s, versus various other
methodologies, such as Spiral or Agile. See, e.g., David L. Parnas, A Rational Design Process: How
and Why to Fake it 3, http://www.cs.tufts.edu/~nr/cs257/archive/david-parnas/fake-it.pdf (criticizing the
Waterfall Model); Kent Beck et al., Manifesto for Agile Software Development (2001),
http://agilemanifesto.org/ (outlining the Agile Model).
17 JOINT TASK FORCE ON COMPUTING CURRICULA, ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, IEEE
COMPUTER SOC’Y, COMPUTER SCIENCE CURRICULA 2013: CURRICULUM GUIDELINES FOR
UNDERGRADUATE
DEGREE
PROGRAMS
IN
COMPUTER
SCIENCE
(2013),
https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/education/cs2013_web_final.pdf.
18 See, e.g., JOINT TASK FORCE ON COMPUTING CURRICULA, ASS’N FOR COMPUTING
MACHINERY, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, COMPUTING CURRICULA 2001: COMPUTER SCIENCE (2001),
https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/education/curricula-recommendations/cc2001.pdf.

Years of studies confirm the common wisdom among experts in software development that proper attention to software development leads to
lower defect rates.19 So why is software so full of vulnerabilities? In large
part because reducing vulnerabilities requires a longer and more costly development process. Consumers have been unwilling to pay for the added
value of security through slightly higher retail prices and companies, dependent on consumer sales, don't offer what consumers don't want. “Businesses are profit-making ventures, so they make decisions based on both
short- and long-term profitability,”20 and the “market often rewards first-tosell and lowest cost rather than extra time and cost in development.”21 The
typical profit-maximizing strategy is to keep costs down and be the first to
offer a particular type of software, even if it is imperfect in a variety of
ways, including having vulnerabilities.22 We discuss software vulnerabilities and a possible remedy in detail elsewhere.23
2.

Human Vulnerabilities

The main human vulnerability is the human propensity to trust. Think
of human vulnerabilities as an unwitting invitation to enter. Vampire movies are a nice analogy. In classic vampire movies, vampires can’t enter a
house unless invited in, so the audience cringes when some innocent person
unwittingly asks the obvious-to-the-audience vampire to cross the threshold. Far too many invite hackers to cross the thresholds of their computers
and networks allowing them to gain “access to buildings, systems or data
19 See generally Anthony Hall, Seven Myths of Formal Methods, 7 IEEE SOFTWARE 11, 11–19
(Sept. 1990) (discussing Praxis studies and the CASE project). See also I. J. Hayes, Applying Formal
Specification to Software Development in Industry, SE-11 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE
ENGINEERING 169, 175–76 (Feb. 1985) (discussing the usefulness of software engineering techniques in
some particular projects); Alan MacCormack et al., Trade-offs Between Productivity and Quality in
Selecting Software Development Practices, 20 IEEE SOFTWARE 78, 81–84 (Sept.–Oct. 2003) (comparing various software engineering techniques).
20 Bruce Schneier, Information Security and Externalities, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 2007),
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2007/01/information_security_1.html.
21 Eugene H. Spafford, Remembrances of Things Pest, 53 COMM. ACM 35, 36 (2010).
22 See generally C. SHAPIRO & H. R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 50–51 (1999). The economics and information security community has developed Shapiro and Varian’s initial insights. Much of this work has been reported in the annual Workshop
on the Economics of Information Security since 2002. For information on the workshops from 2002 to
2010, see http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/index.html. For a good general survey, see Ross Anderson &
Tyler Moore, Information Security: Where Computer Science, Economics and Psychology Meet, 367
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 2717, 2721–22 (2009).
23 See ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: THE CRISIS IN ONLINE
PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY (2013); Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Vulnerable Software: Product-Risk Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access, 2012 UNIV. ILL. J. TECHNOL. LAW
POLICY 45 (2012).

by exploiting human psychology.”24 Phishing is a good example. Phishing
is the use of an electronic communication that masquerades as being from
someone trustworthy in order to gain unauthorized access to information.
For example, in a case study entitled, “Examining how a China-based threat
actor stole vast amounts of PII,” Mandiant notes that:
Phishing attacks continue to be a theme year after year, and this case is no different. It began
with a threat actor successfully enticing a user to follow a malicious link in a phishing email.
The link downloaded a backdoor, providing the threat actor access to the victim’s environment. Once the threat actor obtained a foothold, the reconnaissance activity was primarily
25
centered on the identification of databases with the greatest volume of PII.

Phishing is by no means the only way hackers masquerade themselves
to exploit people’s trust. Other examples include various other forms of
social engineering26 and Trojan horses.27
3.

Vulnerabilities in Networks

The way to reduce human vulnerabilities is hardly a mystery. It is
primarily a matter of adequate education and training.
There is no small set of vulnerabilities that accounts for all or most of
the data breaches. Recent data breaches involve, among other things, misconfigured vendor access,28 lack of encryption of data in motion,29 lack of
encryption of data at rest,30 lack of basic use of firewalls,31 and vulnerabilities in non-mass market infrastructure software. In the case of the Target
24 George V. Hulme & Joan Goodchild, What is Social Engineering? How Criminals Take
Advantage
of
Human
Behavior,
CSO ONLINE
(Aug.
3,
2017,
6:31
AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2124681/social-engineering/security-awareness-social-engineeringthe-basics.html.
25 MANDIANT, M-TRENDS 2016 17 (2016), https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/annual-threatreport/mtrends/rpt-2016-mtrends.html.
26 Social engineering is pretending to be someone else in order to gain access to a computer or
network, or, more generally, to obtain any confidential information. Skip tracers (professionals specializing in locating people) have practiced social engineering for years, and so have debt collectors, bounty
hunters, private investigators, and journalists. Phishing does this via email or malicious websites.
27 A Trojan Horse is malicious program masquerading as a safe and useful one.
28 A vulnerability involved in the Target breach, for example. See Brian Krebs, Inside Target
Breach,
KREBS
ON
SECURITY
(Sept.
21,
2015),
Corp.,
Days
After
2013
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/09/inside-target-corp-days-after-2013-breach/.
29 Target did not encrypt credit card numbers on their way out of the POS machine, instead of
at the point of swipe. Id.
30 The 80 million records stolen from Anthem in 2015 were stored unencrypted and hence readable by the thieves. See, e.g., Lance Whitney, Anthem’s Stolen Customer Data Not Encrypted, CNET
(Feb. 6, 2015, 10:06 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/anthems-hacked-customer-data-was-notencrypted/.
31 See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).

breach, which was particularly well studied, we know that there was quite a
significant number of vulnerabilities that together enabled a breach of that
magnitude.32 It seems likely that, for many of the massive data breaches, a
combination of several different vulnerabilities enabled the breach.
Some network vulnerabilities are certainly software vulnerabilities
since software (both mass market and non-mass market) is involved in running a network. Since human beings use networks, human vulnerabilities
are also common. But not all network vulnerabilities are software or human ones. From now on, we will use “network vulnerabilities” to refer to
non-software, non-human vulnerabilities in networks. These vulnerabilities
are the ones whose remediation requires information that is not currently
available.
To characterize network vulnerabilities, we offer a brief high-level
sketch of how network security works. It works much like security at Chicago’s United Center—the sports arena where the Bulls play basketball and
the Blackhawks play hockey. If you oversaw security there, you would
locate the doors and windows, put locks on all those doors and windows,
lock the ones you do not need open, and post guards at the rest to check
credentials like tickets, press passes, etc. You would also put guards inside
to monitor behavior. Computer and network security is the same. You lock
doors and windows,33 post “credential-checking guards” by verifying authorization,34 and deploy “behavior-monitoring guards,” ranging from home
computer antivirus programs to multimillion-dollar systems defending corporate networks.35
Likewise, competent network administrators know how to reduce network vulnerabilities.36 Notice that we wrote “reduce,” not “eliminate.” In a
large organization, both the routers and internal structure of the network can
be quite complex, and the more complex the network, the more likely a
misjudgment that creates a vulnerability. In addition, hackers “are well
aware of the details of network . . . security mechanisms, and are developing increasingly sophisticated and effective methods for subverting them.”37
Thus, if businesses were meeting the risk management goal, we would ex32 MAJORITY STAFF REPORT FOR CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER, S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
AND TRANSP., A “KILL CHAIN” ANALYSIS OF THE 2013 TARGET DATA BREACH (2014),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/24d3c229-4f2f-405d-b8dba3a67f183883/23E30AA955B5C00FE57CFD709621592C.2014-0325-target-kill-chain-analysis.pdf.
33 Examples include promptly applying patches, using reasonably up-to-date operating systems,
and various uses of encryption.
34 Examples include passwords, more complex multi-factor identification, access control, firewalls, and both black and white listing.
35 Examples include intrusion detection and protection systems, some forms of malware detection,
and various forms of traffic monitoring.
36 See STALLINGS, NETWORK SECURITY ESSENTIALS, supra note 7.
37 Archit Gupta et al., An Empirical Study of Malware Evolution 1, 1 (2009 First International
Communication Systems And Networks Workshops, 2009).

pect to see a few network vulnerabilities. However, in practice, based on
the past decade’s record of breaches, there are lots of network vulnerabilities.
So why, in regard to network vulnerabilities, do businesses typically
fail to meet the business risk management goal? One reason is that corporate culture has struggled to incorporate that goal in its business planning.38
Lack of risk management expertise is another problem.39 We assume businesses will eventually solve those problems. Doing so will not, however,
eliminate a fundamental problem: the lack of information necessary for
adequate risk assessment.
C.

The Lack of Information

To adequately approximate the business risk management goal, a
business has to calculate the expected losses from a data breach over some
appropriate period of time. The expected cost of a data breach is the estimated actual cost of the breach if it occurs multiplied by the probability of
its occurrence. If a business bases this calculation on accurate information
about probabilities and costs, pursuing the business risk management goal
is a profit maximizing strategy. The more inaccurate the information, the
worse the business’s strategy; it will either spend too much or too little.
Unfortunately, there is general agreement that businesses lack sufficiently accurate information about probabilities and costs. A recent World
Economic Forum report paints an accurate, if disturbing, picture of the lack
of relevant data:
There are numerous cyber threats plaguing global organizations. Global data is expanding at
exponential rates in terms of volume, velocity, variety and complexity. Commercial and personal data are increasingly migrating to global, interconnected technology platforms. The
systems that depend upon this data increasingly manage key infrastructure. As access to data
and systems increases via the rapidly evolving, interconnected digital ecosystem, the scale
and types of risks from cyber threats expands proportionately.

Unknowns concerning the scale and impact of cyber threats, as well as relative levels of vulnerability, threatens paralysis. Lacking accepted benchmarks, large organizations struggle to
structure cyber resilience decisions and investments. Organizations lack common measures
to quantify cyber threats, curtailing the ability to make clear strategic decisions concerning
optimal access and investment levels.

38 See, e.g., Marianne Davis, Underinvesting in Cybersecurity: How Do You Know How Much
Security
Is
Enough?,
SYMANTEC
(Aug.
15,
2014),
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/underinvesting-cybersecurity-how-do-you-know-how-muchsecurity-enough.
39 DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD ET AL., HOW TO MEASURE ANYTHING IN CYBERSECURITY RISK 11–15
(2016).

Due to this state of uncertainty, a pervasive concern over growing cyber risks curtails technical and economic development on a global scale. Lacking proper guidance, businesses are
increasingly delaying the adoption of technological innovations due to inadequate understandings of required countermeasures. A tragedy of the commons scenario is emerging surrounding proliferating digital access in an unstable ecosystem, which lacks concerted controls and safeguards. A vicious circle results: uncertainty regarding proper levels of preparedness leads to forestalled investments in safeguards as interconnection expands exponential40
ly.

The report identifies two sources of uncertainty. The first is that the
magnitude of the losses is not sufficiently well known: there are
“[u]nknowns concerning the scale and impact of cyber threats.” The second is that the probability of a loss is not sufficiently well known: there are
“[u]nknowns concerning . . . relative levels of vulnerability.” This puts a
significant roadblock in the way of pursuing the business risk management
goal.
The same point holds for consumer risk management, to which we
now turn.
II.

DEFENDING CONSUMERS

Risk management, whether business or consumer, requires reliable information—ideally, highly accurate information—about both the magnitude
of the loss and the probability of its occurrence. For consumer risk management, the relevant magnitudes and probabilities are the magnitudes and
probabilities of consumer losses. Neither is sufficiently well known. There
have been far fewer studies of consumer losses, and, if it is problematic to
accurately correlate the cost and probability of business losses with types of
data breach, it is all the more difficult to do so in the case of consumer losses, where the relevant data is less available.
In the consumer context, the lack of information has consequences for
the effectiveness of making businesses legally liable for consumer losses.
Before turning to that issue, we briefly address the prior question of whether businesses should be liable for those losses.

40 WORLD ECON. FORUM, PARTNERING FOR CYBER RESILIENCE TOWARDS THE QUANTIFICATION
CYBER
THREATS
9
(2015),
OF
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFUSA_QuantificationofCyberThreats_Report2015.pdf.
Others
make the same points: “It has also long been known that we simply do not have good statistics on online
crime, attacks and vulnerabilities. Companies are hesitant to discuss their weaknesses with competitors
even though a coordinated view of attacks could allow faster mitigation to everyone’s benefit. In the
USA, this problem has been tackled by information-sharing associations, security-breach disclosure
laws and vulnerability markets.” Ross Anderson et al., Security Economics and European Policy 3
(2008), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/enisa-short.pdf.

A.

The Landlord/Tenant Analogy

There is a strong argument that businesses should bear a considerable
part of the defensive burden. Consider an analogy with landlords and tenants. The “landlords” are the various kinds of businesses that store consumer data online.41 Call them collectively data holders. “Tenants” divide
into the data that resides with the data holder and the consumer subjects of
that data. What makes the analogy apt is that unauthorized access to the
data can harm the subjects. The argument is that just as landlords can be
liable for harm to tenants from unauthorized access to the landlords’ buildings, so data holders should be liable for harm caused to consumers by unauthorized access to the data they store. To see the argument, consider the
landlord/tenant case, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation.42 Kline was assaulted in the common areas of the apartment
building in which she lived.43 She sued for negligence alleging that the
building owner unreasonably failed to provide adequate security.44 The
court agreed:
The landlord is no insurer of his tenants' safety, but he certainly is no bystander. And where,
as here, the landlord has notice of repeated criminal assaults and robberies, has notice that
these crimes occurred in the portion of the premises exclusively within his control, has every
reason to expect like crimes to happen again, and has the exclusive power to take preventive
action, it does not seem unfair to place upon the landlord a duty to take those steps which are
within his power to minimize the predictable risk to his tenants.

....

As between tenant and landlord, the landlord is the only one in the position to take the necessary acts of protection required. He is not an insurer, but he is obligated to minimize the risk
to his tenants. Not only as between landlord and tenant is the landlord best equipped to
guard against the predictable risk of intruders, but even as between landlord and the police
power of government, the landlord is in the best position to take the necessary protective
measures. Municipal police cannot patrol the entryways and the hallways, the garages and
the basements of private multiple unit apartment dwellings. They are neither equipped,
manned, nor empowered to do so. In the area of the predictable risk which materialized in
this case, only the landlord could have taken measures which might have prevented the inju45
ries suffered by appellant.

The court held that the landlord was required to take reasonable steps
to defend tenants in common areas from harm from unauthorized access to
41 Businesses range from resource- and expertise-rich corporations to mom-and-pop retailers.
There is a pressing question of how small and medium sized businesses are to meet the risk management
goals we suggest here.
42 Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
43 Id. at 478.
44 Id. at 489.
45 Id. at 481, 484.

those areas.46 Advances in technology have resulted in a new type of “landlord”—data holders. Like traditional landlords, they are typically in the
best position to take steps to prevent the harm to data subjects that may
follow a data breach.
So why not require data holders to take reasonable steps to prevent
harm to the data subjects? We find that rationale to do so compelling, and,
indeed, to an extent, the law already does so through common law negligence47 and through various statutory requirements.48 We will not discuss
the exact form the reasonableness requirement should take. Our point is
that unless the necessary risk management information is available, a reasonableness requirement will be ineffective.
B.

Lack of Data Means Lack of an Effective Legal Incentive

To see why, consider an analogy. Suppose you are a teacher who
would like students to write something to engage in adequate explanation
and reflection. To achieve this goal, you tell them they must write a paper
with enough pages to get a passing grade, but you do not tell them how
many pages are enough. That would not only be unfair, it would also fail to
create the right incentive for sufficient explanation and reflection. Some
would write too little, expending less time and effort than they should, some
would write too much, expending more time and effort than they should.
Network defense is similar. Some businesses will invest too little in defense, some, too much.
Some may object that this argument looks only at the short-term consequences of imposing liability in the absence of relevant information about
probabilities in costs. Why not impose liability to give businesses an incentive to develop ways to obtain the information they now lack? The classic
torts case of The T. J. Hooper49 is a good example, even though it involved
providing an incentive to adopt technology that already existed, not providing an incentive to create information gathering practices that do not.
The tugboats the Montrose and the T. J. Hooper encountered a gale
while towing barges up the Atlantic coast, and the tugs and the barges

46 See id. at 487.
47 At least in theory. The application of negligence is limited by the foreseeability requirement
(see, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service Corporation, Inc., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006
WL 288483, (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) and the economic harm rule (see, e.g., Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ's
Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206 (M.D. Pa. 2006)).
48 See, e.g., HIPAA Security Rule 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(A)(1), and the Gramm-Leach Bliley Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 314.3. For an excellent discussion of the Federal Trade Commission’s approach to security, see CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY (2016).
49 The TJ Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d. Cir. 1932).

sank.50 The tugs did not have shortwave radios.51 Had they been so
equipped, they would have received reports of the storm and put in at the
Delaware breakwater to ride the storm out in safety.52 Shortwave radios,
however, were new technology, and the industry standard was for tugs not
to have one.53 The court nonetheless held that it was unreasonable not to
equip the tug with a radio as a precaution against losses from storms.54
But notice that the risk management calculations are easy. It is obvious that the expected loss exceeds the cost of the radio. Owners know that
the losses, when they do occur, can be huge, and they know that, while the
occurrence of violent storms is difficult to predict, their occurrence from
time to time is certain. So, tugboat owners should realize that they should
buy a radio.
So why not impose liability for consumer losses from a data breach to
give businesses an incentive to develop and implement effective information gathering practices? The incentive is unlikely to be effective. Contrasts with The T. J. Hooper show why. To begin with, tug boat owners
could unilaterally buy shortwave radios, but businesses cannot unilaterally
collect enough information. To figure the relevant probabilities and costs
for a wide range of possible data breaches, a business needs information
about the types of data breaches and associated losses that occur across a
wide range of businesses. Determining probabilities and costs will require
aggregating that information.
III. BETTER DEFENSE WITHOUT BETTER DATA?
Lack of sufficient information about relevant probabilities and costs
does not mean it is impossible for businesses to improve their data security.
We consider three possibilities: reliance on expert opinion, outsourcing, and
compliance with data breach notification statutes. Each option, however,
falls far short of approximating the business and consumer risk management goals.

50
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52
53
54

Id. at 737.
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See id. at 740.
See id.

A.

Expert Opinion

Lacking sufficient information to accurately determine probabilities
and costs,55 businesses can turn to educated guesses—that is, to wellinformed expert opinion. As one predictive analytics practitioner noted:
Where very little data is available, it’s not possible to use standard mathematics or statistical
techniques, but what you can do is create models based on expert opinion. These won’t be as
good as a statistical model built on a much larger sample, but these types of models can often
56
provide a reasonable level of predictive accuracy.

Relying on expert opinion is reasonable given the current lack of information. But, relying merely on expert opinion is still not a reliable guide
to meeting either risk management goal. Expert opinion may still over- or
underestimate probabilities and costs, and in such cases a business will
spend less or more than required to meet the goal.
B.

Outsourcing

Outsourcing security recommends itself as at least a partial solution to
the lack of information problem. One necessary step toward curing the lack
of information is aggregating relevant information from a wide variety of
businesses. Outsourcing security will help with that task by concentrating
the information from several businesses in a single place. Outsourcing also
makes good financial sense. As security and privacy expert Bruce Schneier
noted:
A company can get the security expertise it needs much more cheaply by hiring someone
else to provide it. Take monitoring, for example. The key to successful security monitoring
is vigilance: attacks can happen at any time of the day, any day of the year. While it is possible for companies to build detection and response services for their own networks, it's rarely cost-effective. Staffing for security expertise 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, requires
five full-time employees—more when you include supervisors and backup personnel with
specialized skills. Even if an organization could find the budget for all of these people, it
would be very difficult to hire them in today's job market. Retaining them would be even
harder. Security monitoring is inherently erratic: six weeks of boredom followed by eight
hours of panic, then seven weeks of boredom followed by six hours of panic. Attacks against

55 In the case of the frequency interpretation of probability, a determination is accurate if closely
approximates the actual frequency. For the belief interpretation, a determination is accurate to the
extent it requires little or no revision in the light of future information.
56 STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA: MYTHS,
MISCONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 232 (2014).

a single organization don't happen often enough to keep a team of this caliber engaged and
57
interested.

Security outsourcing companies like AllClearID, BayDynamics,
Healthguard Cyber Risk Management, and FireEye provide reasonable security options, especially for small and medium-sized businesses that may
not be able to afford a significant investment in information security. Indeed, because basic outsourcing services are sufficiently inexpensive, they
may be the twenty-first century equivalent of The T. J. Hooper shortwave
radio. One may well see legal liability imposed for not using them.
Outsourcing is an attractive and important development; however, as
currently practiced, it relies on models built using expert opinions, so it
does not lead to an adequate approximation of either risk management
goals. There are also privacy concerns. Businesses outsourcing security
run their incoming data through the outsourcer. The outsourcer’s access to
the information raises privacy concerns, and some outsourcers do indeed
analyze this data for advertising purposes.
C.

Data Breach Notification Laws

Data breach notification laws may seem like an attractive option that
both forces the disclosure of information about breaches without the privacy concerns of outsourcing and improves security, so its proponents claim.
As Bruce Schneier notes:
There are three reasons for breach notification laws. One, it's common politeness that when
you lose something of someone else's, you tell him. The prevailing corporate attitude before
the law—“They won't notice, and if they do notice they won't know it's us, so we are better
off keeping quiet about the whole thing”—is just wrong. Two, it provides statistics to security researchers as to how pervasive the problem really is. And three, it forces companies to
58
improve their security.

We focus on the second and third reasons, beginning with the third.
The laws certainly do lead businesses to increase security. The reason is
that publicizing data breaches can impose significant costs on businesses,59
and the threat of such losses has led businesses to increase online security.60
Does the increase yield a more effective pursuit of the goal of consumer risk management? We have found little relevant evidence, other than
57 Bruce Schneier, The Case for Outsourcing Security, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (2002),
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2002/01/the_case_for_outsour.html.
58 Bruce Schneier, State Data Breach Notification Laws: Have They Helped? SCHNEIER ON
SECURITY (2009), https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2009/01/state_data_breach_no.html.
59 Cost of Data Breach Study, supra note 2, at 19.
60 Cost of Data Breach Study, supra note 2, at 15.

a study focusing on identity theft. 61 There is some evidence that the laws
reduce identity theft.62 The identity theft study correlates the existence of
data breach notification laws with reductions in identity theft.63 One cannot
simply infer, however, that an increase in security is responsible for the
reduction. Reductions in identity theft may result from of a variety of factors other than increased security.64 Furthermore, even if data breach laws
do trigger increases in security that reduce identity theft, that still falls short
of showing that those laws decrease overall consumer risk to the point
where the consumer risk management goal is attained. The reason is that
the harm from unauthorized access reaches far beyond identity theft. It
includes harm from ransomware, denial of services attacks, botnets engaged
in fraud and other illegal activities, and viruses.65 The available evidence is
thus inconclusive at best.
There is, moreover, a general reason to doubt that data breach notification requirements get us to the consumer risk management goal. It emerges
from considering the costs of compliance with notification requirements.
Those costs include: forensic and investigative activities, assessment and
audit services, crisis team management and communications to executive
management and board of directors, notification costs, remediation activities, legal expenditures, product discounts, identity protection services and
regulatory interventions, and lost business.66 Data breach notification laws
create an incentive to avoid those costs. It would be surprising if avoiding
those business costs were strongly correlated with improved consumer risk
management.
Indeed, there is some reason to think such a correlation is unlikely.
The reason is that the laws define the type of event a business must report.67
They thus create an incentive to reduce reportable data breaches. They do
not create an incentive to improve security in regard to problems that do not
manifest themselves as reportable data breaches. As professor David Thaw
61 David Thaw’s work is an important exception. See David Thaw, Data Breach (Regulatory)
Effects, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 163 (2015) (arguing that “an affirmative presumption of
notification is superior from a cybersecurity perspective. Such a presumption avoids disincentivizing
thorough cybersecurity investigations, which are one of the most important tools in protecting consumers against future data breaches and securing existing information systems.”)
62 Id. at 161.
63 Id.
64 Richard J. Sullivan & Jesse Leigh Maniff, Data Breach Notification Laws, FED. RESERVE
BANK
OF
KANSAS
CITY,
https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/econrev/econrevarchive/2016/1q16sullivanmaniff.
pdf.
65 DETICA, supra note 4, at 2.
66 Cost of Data Brach Study, supra note 2, at 3.
67 CENT.S FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV.S, CMS Information Security and Privacy Overview,
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/cms-informationtechnology/informationsecurity/ (last modified Apr. 27, 2018).

notes, specific statutory regulations like data breach notifications laws can
drive
perhaps-otherwise-sufficient security budgets toward specific compliance objectives, such as
encryption. This, in turn, reduces the available resources for other security activities
and
forces CISOs to focus on meeting minimum compliance objectives rather than prioritizing
the greatest threats they feel their organization face[s]. With an abundance of low-hanging
fruit available to regulators–even if likely through malfeasance, not misfeasance–the bar is
set extremely low. Thus, regulators are faced with an "industry standard" set perhaps below
their optimal level. As long as low-hanging fruit remains available to regulators, CISOs will
not be able to justify requests for new resources on the grounds that peer organizations with
comparable policies have been subject to enforcement action. Nor will they be able to justify
requests based on the regulations themselves, as "reasonable" lacks an operational definition
any higher than the low hanging fruit provided by cases [involving obvious and egregious
security weaknesses] such as B.J.'s Wholesale Club, T.J. Maxx Cos., and Twitter. And so the
68
cycle continues.

Similar worries arise for the role of data breach notification laws in
forcing businesses to divulge information about data breaches. They certainly do that. But the information businesses provide is only information
about reportable data breaches. Data breach notification laws do not create
an incentive to report information about data breaches generally.
IV. MANDATORY ANONYMOUS REPORTING
To estimate the probability of a data breach, we need information
about the occurrence of data breaches across a wide range of businesses.
The costs of a data breach divide into the costs to businesses and the costs
to consumers. To aggregate information about the occurrence of data
breaches and their costs to businesses, we suggest obtaining that information through mandatory collection in a central depository and through
the sharing of an anonymous summary of the data to all of the mandatory
reporters. The data would allow the depository to provide high quality data
to the business world about the actual prevalence and cost of breaches in
practice today.69 Mandatory sharing has at least two advantages over voluntary sharing. If sharing is voluntary, businesses will weigh the benefits of
68 David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 287, 368-69
(2014).
69 Some worry that the data may have limited predictive value. See Annmarie Geddes Baribeau,
Cyber Insurance: The Actuarial Conundrum, INSUR. COMMUN. 33, 37-38 (2015) (providing, “[W]hile
actuaries do need as much historical data as they can get, past data is not always indicative of future
events or their costs. ‘The challenge is much greater than not having enough historical data . . . Because
cyber risk is both growing and rapidly evolving, information about the past may be of limited predictive
value.’”). To some extent, the risk that one’s data is not representative is inherent in all risk management. Where cyber risk changes rapidly, companies would be well advised to base their predictions on
a smaller, more recent sample rather than a larger, but necessarily less recent sample.

information sharing with the risks and costs of doing so, and they may decide that the benefits are insufficient. In particular, at the beginning of a
voluntary program, the initially small pool of information means limited
benefits, so businesses may be unwilling to participate until enough others
do. It may be possible to overcome these problems, but we put them aside.
Our concern is to defend mandatory sharing as an acceptable option.
There are at least three existing models in the broad ballpark of what
we have in mind. One is the 2015 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
(CISA), which is voluntary, but covers quite similar information.70 The second is the mandatory reporting of certain electrical outages to the Department of Energy (DOE).71 Finally, there is the required, completely confidential reporting of network outages to the FCC under the Network Outage
Reporting System (NORS).72 Each of these three is informative, but not
one is a perfect match. CISA is voluntary.73 The DOE reporting covers a
much smaller number of incidents than any estimates of the current number
of computer security incidents; for example, the public summary of electrical outage events from January through July 2017 shows only 91 total reported events.74 The data from NORS does not become public nor, as far as
we know, is it ever shared with the cable, satellite, telephone, etc. companies that provide the data to the FCC; the FCC says, “Given the sensitive
nature of this data to both national security and commercial competitiveness, the outage data is presumed to be confidential.”75
To aggregate information about the consumer cost of data breaches,
we do not propose any sort of mandatory reporting by consumers to the
government. It would raise significant privacy issues to require consumers
to report the type of data involved in a breach, the storage location of the
data, and the type and extent of the losses sustained. We propose instead
government-initiated or government-funded research, which focuses on
consumers who consent to provide their information. The approach is far
from unproblematic, but we put those issues aside. We focus primarily on
mandatory reporting by businesses.

70 CYBER SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015, 6 U.S.C. § 148.
71 15 U.S.C. § 772 mandates the sharing of the information. See Emily Fisher, Joseph H. Eto &
Kristina Hamachi LaCommare, Understanding Bulk Power Reliability: The Importance of Good Data
and a Critical Review of Existing Sources 2159–2168 (2012 45th HI Int’l Conf. on Sys. Sci., 2012),
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6149274/.
72 FED.
COMMC’NS.
COMM’N.,
Network
Outage
Reporting
System
(NORS),
https://www.fcc.gov/network-outage-reporting-system-nors (last viewed Dec. 4, 2018).
73 CYBER SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT, 6 U.S.C. § 148.
74 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Electric Disturbance Events (OE-417) Annual Summaries,
https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417_annual_summary.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2018).
75 FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N., supra note 72.

A.

Sketch of Our Proposal for Reporting

We propose a reporting regime for computer security incidents for organizations that are closest to the DOE electrical outage reporting, or more
specifically, to the first part of the DOE’s mandatory two-part reporting
form, OE-417.76 That form has two parts, Schedules 1 and 2; the first part
is highly structured, consisting of checkboxes, and constrained, very short
answer questions, such as “estimate number of customers affected,” and fits
on two pages.77 Schedule 1 is made public.78 Schedule 2, which asks for a
narrative description, is not made public.79
Similarly, we envision a mandatory report that would consist of
checkboxes and very short answer questions asking for the size, type, and
estimated costs of a breach, along with several attributes about the organization attacked and its defenses. As mentioned, the DOE makes the Schedule 1 information from every reported electrical outage incident public.80
We would do the same, but redact the name of the organization and any
geographic information. We would also round numerical reports, making
them at least modestly more difficult to associate with particular incidents.
The goal is not to anonymize all reports, but rather to attempt to anonymize
many of the reports of smaller incidents.81 Because the major incidents are
often widely reported news events and may also be subject to mandatory
public disclosure, there is no point in trying to anonymize them.
B.

Benefits of the Proposed Reporting

The information gathered and reported, together with an estimate of
the number of organizations required to report, will give both researchers
and organizations themselves the data needed to make reasonably accurate
estimates of the probability of a security incident, and more specifically, the
probability of a security incident of a specific cost. This is precisely the
information that we have argued is needed but is currently missing. It
76 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OE-417 ELECTRIC EMERGENCY AND DISTURBANCE REPORT,
https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/OE417_Form_05312021.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 We write “attempt to anonymize” rather than “anonymize” because of the frequent successes of
computer scientists in deanonymizing supposedly anonymized datasets over the past decade or two.
See, e.g., A. Narayanan & V. Shmatikov, De-anonymizing Social Networks 173–187 (PROC. OF IEEE
SYMP. ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 2009); Arvind Narayanan & Vitally Shmatikov, Robust Deanonymization of Large Sparse Datasets 111–125 (PROC. OF IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY
2008); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).

makes sense for the federal government to collect this data nationwide, but
that is not absolutely necessary. If just a handful of states, or even one
large enough state with enough business activity were to gather and report
this information, then that would probably suffice. Estimates of breach
probabilities based on, say, only California or only Texas would not be
quite as accurate as those based on the nation as a whole, but they should
still be quite good.
The collection we have in mind should be able to be done at quite a
low cost for both the reporting companies and for whatever government
agency collects and publishes it. There is no reason a report shouldn’t fit
on a two-page form, just like Schedule 1 of OE-417.
C.

Privacy Concerns?

Prior to its passage, privacy advocates “asked Congress to kill or reform the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, a bill that they [said hid]
new government surveillance mechanisms in the guise of security protections.”82 The issue was that the shared information in CISA could include
detailed information about various consumers’ data or online behavior if it
was relevant to a breach. It is difficult to see how our proposal, for short
reporting of the size and nature of a breach and an organization’s defenses,
could become a surveillance system in the guise of security protection. We
envision businesses reporting only the size, type, and approximate cost to
the business of a breach along with several relevant attributes of the business and its defenses. With a little information on which organizations are
required to report, this would allow businesses and other organizations to
calculate expected business losses. It is difficult to see how sharing and
disclosing such information threatens privacy.
V.

CONCLUSION

Business and consumer information sharing can provide the data necessary to adequately approximate the business and consumer risk management goals. This would improve defenses against data breaches by reducing network vulnerabilities. It would do so on two conditions. First, businesses incorporate the risk management goals into their business planning.83
Second, businesses have sufficient information about data breach losses,
and they face liability to some appropriate extent for failing to meet the
82 Michael Reynolds, CISA Security Bill Passes Senate with Privacy Flaws Unfixed, WIRED
(Oct. 27, 2015, 5:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/cisa-cybersecurity-information-sharing-actpasses-senate-vote-with-privacy-flaws/.
83 See generally supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.

consumer risk management goal. Even then, information sharing remains a
partial solution to the problem of improving data breach defenses. One
must also reduce software and human vulnerabilities. Information sharing
is nonetheless an essential step in the right direction.

